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Ill THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN P. WHITCOME,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 147If*

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY AND HOARD OF
REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant is appealing from a decision of the Board
of Review, Industrial Commission of Utah denying unemployment
benefits under the Employment Security Act of Utah Code Annotated
[hereinafter cited as U. C. A.]
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Decision of the
Board of the Board of Review and a deteirmination of benefits
under the provisions of U. C. A.

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, John P. Whitcome, responsible management
employee at Valley Roofing Company, initiated a claim for
unemployment benefits under the Employment Security Act on
November 10, 1975. Valley Roofing Company is a corporation
owned by Claimant and his wife, Carole Whitcome, President
of the company.
Appellant began working for Valley Roofing in
May, 1974. He stopped working and effective October 27,
1974 his benefits were assessed at $93.00 per week, $93.00
effective March 23, 1975, under the extended benefit program.
He began working again May 17, 1975. The weeks for which
benefits have been denied are those ended April 5 - May
24, 1976. Appellant worked for only one week in May for Which
he was paid $200.00

Appellant received a check for $100.00

in April which was a draw on future employment and not
a wage as defined in the Code.

During the remainder of

the weeks, Appellant was unemployed.

Upon filing for benefits on November 10, 1975,
claimant indicated that he was hired by Valley Roofing
Company on April 1, 1975 and Submitted a separation notice
showing the same date.

Then on December 4, 1975, the claimant

signed a statement in which he stated that he began work

-2-
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on or about April 7, 1975 and that he was paid $100.00
during the week of April 12, 1975.

m

his statement was

written by John Warner, investigator for the Department
after a conference with Appellant lasting approximately
4 1/2 - 5 hours.
Appellant is charged with knowingly failing to
report material facts of his employment to obtain benefits
under the Employment Security Act.

As a result of this

hearing held in the office of the Utah Department of Employment
Security in Logan, Utah, Appellant was disqualified under
provisions of Sec. 35 -4-5 (e) U. C. A. and ordered to
repay $837.00 which he received for the weeks within his
disqualification period. The Board of Review found the
decision of the Appeals Referee to be supported by the
evidence.

Appellant brings this appeal on the grounds

that the findings are not supported by the evidence*
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

APPELLANT, HAVING RECEIVED NO WAGES OR EARNINGS

DURING ANY WEEKS CLAIMED AND HAVING MET ALL ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS OF SEC. 35-4-4, IS THEREBY ENTITLED
^0 BENEFITS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN NOT REVERSING

THE APPEAL REFEREE'S DECISION BECAUSE THERE WAS
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN IT AND
THERE WAS PROOF OF FACTS TO SHOW CLAIMANT'S
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. I
APPELLANT, HAVING RECEIVED NO WAGES OR EARNINGS
DURING ANY WEEKS CLAIMED AND HAVING MET ALL ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS OF SEC. 35-4-4, IS THEREBY ENTITLED
TO BENEFITS UNDER THE EMPLOYEMENT SECURITY ACT.
The primary question presented by the Board of
Review's Decision is whether Appellant worked for any income
or wage during the weeks ending April 5 - May 24, 1975,
which he failed to report to the Department of Employment
Security.

While Section 35-4-10(h) U. C. A, provides that

"[i]n any judicial proceeding under this section the findings
of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the facts
If- supported by evidence shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction
of said court shall be confined to questions of law" (emphasis
added), there is no uncontroverted substantial evidence
which tends to show that Appellant was employed during
the weeks in question.
To be eligible for benefits, one must be unemployed
as defined in Sec. 35-4-22 U.C.A.

A person is unemployed

"in any week during which he performs no services and with
respect to
which
no wages
are
payble
toLawhim,
or in any
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library,
J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

week ot less than tull time work if the wages payable to
him with respect to such weeK are less tnan his weeKly
I

benefit amount.
Appellant received no wages during tne weeks
in question.

A review of the checks, received as Exhinit

8 the hearing, demonstrates that during the months of April
and May, only the following checks were written to John
Whitcome:
Check #333 on 4/11/75 in the amount of $100.UO
Check #356 on 5/19/75 in the amount ot $188.00
Tne $100.00 check, however, was a araw on the
tuture earnings of Valley Roofing's first job of the spring
(Tr. 29). This amount was erroneously reported later in
May as earnings (tr. 2^). The $18u.0i) check was earned
was wages; however, this amount was properly reported as
earnings for tte wcrk done during the weeK of May 17tn (Tr.
28). This was the only week Appellant was employed during
the weeks in question.
MR. ANDERSON:

okay,so in fact, before June

1, 1975, wnat you1re saying is you worked
one week in May.
MR. WHITCOME:

Right, and reported it. (Tr. 29).

Under Section 35-4-2^ (p) U. C. A., wages "means all
remuneration for personal services including commissions
and bonuses and tne cash valye of all remuneration in any
medium other tnan cash."

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Clearly, an advance for living expenses does not become a "wage"
under this detinition and Appellant should not be penalized.
The fact that Appellant was not employed is substantiated
also by the signed statements suDmittea by Valley Hoofing
Company's first customers,

Marlin C. Moth's statement is lucid:

"Roof was installed approximately May ±5tn of
1 9 7 D . However, Valley Roofing had constructed
the roof weeks ahead of time, but: was unable
to install roof oecause of pad weather conditions.
Had many problems in construction due to weather.
(Exhibit 8)
Aaron Tracy of Aaron Tracy Building Specialities
stated:
"Valley xoofing did a job for Aaron Tracy
Builders, starting approximately May Iz,
1975. This job had been ready weeks ahead
of time, but due to weather we had, late
snows in May and the first week in June,
we were unable to have the job fully
complete until tne middle of June."
(Exhibit i) .
Representations of E. A. Milier and Sons Packing,
c., inc. also stated:
"Weather did not permit Valley Roofing to start
his work until the end of May." (Exhibit 10).
The answer to why appellant did not commence
worKing until April is clear.

MR. ANDERSON:

After that time do you have any

recollection as to why you didn't get to working
until the middle of May.

-6-
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MR. WHITCOME:

Yeah, it was because of the weather —

last year the weather was really bad because
at the same time the other roofers in the valley
were crying they

had work they couldn't get

done. (Tr. 29).
It is more than clear to one considering all the
evidence that no wages were paid and no services were performed
between the weeks ending April 5th and May 24, 1975 which
were not reported.
Further,

Appellant complied with all eligibility

requirements of Sec. 35-4-4 U. C. A.

Appellant (1) had

made claims in accordance with all regulations, (2) had
registered for work, (3) was able to work, (4) was unemployed
for a one week waiting period, (5) had furnished a separation
sheet, and (6) had worked a cumulative 19 weeks during
the base period, earning at least $20.00 each week.

Appellant

was properly unemployed during the weeks he claimed benefits.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE MO. II
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN NOT REVERSING
THE APPEAL REFEREE'S DECISION BECAUSE THERE WAS
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN IT AND
THERE WAS PROOF OF ^ACTS TO SHOW CLAIMANT•S
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.
While the Supreme Court of Utah has established
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that a "decision by the Commission will not be disturbed
if reasonably supported by the evidence" (emphasis added)
Child v Board of Review of Industrial Commission of State
of Utah, 8 U 2d 239, 332 P. 2d 928 (1958), see also
Johnson v Board of Review of Industrial Commission Department of Employment Security, 7 U. 2d 113, 320 P. 2d 315
(1958), the Court in a later case, restated its established
rule of review regarding Review Board decisions.

Significantly,

a "reversal and the compelling of such an award of benefits
could be justified only if there is no substantial evidence
to sustain the determination and there was proof of facts
giving rise to the right of compensation so clear and persuasive
that the Commission's refusal to accept and make an award
was clearly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable."
Kenhecott Copper Corp. Employees v Dept. of Employment Security,
13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962).
Appellant is charged with knowingly withholding
material facts of work and earnings in order to receive
benefits to which he is not entitled.

The evidence does not

show any work which Appellant can be charged with doing
during the weeks in question.

Further, a determination that

he had earnings of $184.61 for each of those weeks is clearly
contrary to the evidence.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(

The Board accepted April 1, 1975 as the true date
on which employment began for Appellant, Barry Baker and
David Whitcome.

However, that date is inaccurate.

REFEREE:

Do you have a copy of that separation notice?

MR. WHITCOME: No.
REFEREE:

Do you know what the dates are on that notice?

MR. WHITCOME:

He was laid off about the 1st or 2nd

week in November.
REFEREE:

Did you have a starting date on that notice?

MR. WHITCOME:
REFEREE:

What date was that?

MR. WHITCOME:

REFEREE:

Yeah, I did.

4/1/75

How did you arrive at that date?

MR. WHITCOME:

I guessed.

office had the records
accurate.

—

I figured the unemployment
I didn't need to be that

I didn't have the information available

to me at the time when I filled them out.
REFEREE:

I'm curious as to how you always arrived

at the figure of 4/1/75.
MR. WHITCOME:
—

Wellf its the beginning of the quarter

I knew he didn't work the quarter before but I

knew he had worked in that quarter so I just did
it like that.

If you will look back, all the

employees I did the same thing to.

I realize

I filled the forms out wrong but after they
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were sent in, then there's nothing you can do.

By his own admission, Mr. Archibald, auditor
for the Department said that new employers are given the
benefit of the doubt when records are lacking.
MR. ARCHIBALD:

For the year 1975.

And seeing

that there was no way of knowing if these wages
were actually paid or not, and Valley Roofing
being a new employer, we gave them the benefit
of the doubt. We will work with new employers
and this is one of our reasonings behind when
we did this audit. (Tr. 10-11).
Additional facts surrounding the weeks in question
are germane.

Mr. Warner, Department investigator stated

that the date of April 1, 1975 had nothing to do with the
commencement of work by Appellant.

However, in his testimony

just prior to that comment, he recognized the seasonal
nature of the roofing business.
MR. ANDERSON:

Then you knew this when you filled

out this form?

The one I'm referring to is 6 30

(b) excuse me 60 3 (b) —
MR. WARNER:
MR. ANDERSON:
were

you knew they were roofers?

Right
Are you at all familiar —

or

you familiar at that time with the seasonal

nature of this work?
MR. WARNER:
MR. ANDERSON:

-

I understand it's seasonal.
Didn't you, in fact, then, when

you went through all these dates when they
all said April 1st, didn't you tend to wonder
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

that there might be some leeway as related
to the seasonal nature of this work?
MR. WARNER:

No, I don't see what April 1st would

have to do with it.

I feel —

my understanding

is that roofing can be done in January, February,
April, May —

any good day or good week —

a

person could go out and put a roof on any time
of the year.

(Tr. 15-16).

Mr. Itfarner chose to ignore the fact that roofing
is done piece-work whenever the weather is suitable, but generally
during the spring and summer months.

In particular, the spring ,

of 1975 was riddled with harsh weather well into April, May
and June; it is totally consistent with Appellant's statement
that he began working after April 1, 1975. In fact, the referee
himself stated that he would wconcede that we had bad weather
in the spring of • 75". (Tr. 29).
In support thereof, signed written statements were
admitted to the effect that Valley Roofing did not begin work
for its customers until at least May 12, 1975. Marlin C. Hoth
Construction (Exhibit 8), Aaron Tracy Builders (Exhibit 9), and
Miller and Sons Packing (Exhibit 10) submitted statements that
work by Valley Roofing had commenced on May 15, May 12 and the
end of May consecutively.

All cited bad weather conditions as

the reason for the late date of construction work.
I).

(see point

Thus, there is no substantial evidence to support the Board's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Decision.
Appellant's testimony that his use of April 1st as
the date of employment was mistaken is consistent with the evidence
notwithstanding any statements he made in error under pressure
from Department representatives.
In particular, the statement taken by Gerald Warner
and signed by Appellant on December 4, 1976 is not reliable regarding
the dates and admissions therein.

First, the investigator had

questioned him from 5:30 until at least 9:00 p.m. (Tr. 17) and
both were apparently tired at the close of the session.

In reference

to the December 4th stateent, the Referee clarified the alleged
essence of the statement.
REFEREE:

What it was saying is that you

worked during the month of April and May and
did not report the information because
you needed the unemployment benefits.
MR. WHITCHOME:

Yeah, but that is not the case

because when we worked, we wrote it on the
cards and sent it back in and when we
didn't work we just put zero and
sent it back in.
REFEREE:

How would Mr. Warner have gotten

the information that you worked during
April if you hadn't told him?

-12-
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MR. WIIITCOME: A lot of thisr when he wrote
it out he said what about this and this I
said yeahf I don't know.

And so he wrote

it down and I signed it. (Tr. 17).
To capitalize on Mr. Whitcome's confusion as to what
wages were, Mr. Warner even wrote part of the document and dictated
the remainder.
MR. WHITCOME:

Yeah, in fact he was the one telling

me almost word for word what to write.

He had

written it down once and it didn't sound right
so I just continued on from what he started.
He'd been there quite awhile —

by then I

think he had writer's cramp. (Tr. 23).
The evidence points not to a shrewd, deceptive claimant,
but to a man unfamiliar with statutorily defined terms, such
as wages, vainly attempting to justify his unintentional errors
more than seven months later.

When Mr. Warner confronted him

with a check for $100.00 and dated April 11th, he apparently
thought he needed to justify the check in some manner.

This

attempt at accountability is reiterated in the hearing testimony
regarding the reporting of the $100.00 advance.

(Tr. 18-19).

Had Appellant intended to falsify his reports in
order to defraud the Commission, he would certainly not have
written the same date on all the employee's claims, including
his own.

That would only draw attention to such a scheme. Indeed

attention was focused on the pattern and illuminated not a

-13-
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fraud but to an admitted mistake.
Secondly, there are facts which tend to show that the
Board's Decision to deny compensation was unreasonable and, in
fact, arbitrary and capricious based on the evidence. Appellant
John Whitcome testified to the reasons for putting April 1st
on the employee separation sheets.

See Point I. The investigator's

method of calculating the amount allegedly earned by Appellant
based on the incorrect date is totally unacceptable as not reflective
of the facts. Appellant could and did earn w$l,250.00 in only
part of the second quarter due to the weather and nature of the
roofing business.
Also a function of the seasonal nature of the work
is the fact that employees are paid for their work when the company
is paid. (Tr. 30). None of the claimants receive a calculable
weekly wage or salary, including Appellant. Since the busiest
part of the season is in May and June, then in September and
October (Tr. 27), it is completely consistent, in retrospect,
that Appellant earned $1,250.00 in the last part of the quarter.
(Tr. 35). To take this amount and divide it by the number of
weeks in the quarter is an arbitrary exercise of power by the
Department.

The true employment picture is drastically altered

by the Department's method of assessing earnings for each auarter.
The Board's acceptance of this averaging of total pay has no
relation to reality and does not provide substantial, if any,
support for the Board's Decision.
The Decision is also unreasonable in light of other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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assumptions implicit in the Findings of Fact and Comments. *!o
mention is made of either the adverse weather conditions during
the spring of 1975 or of the seasonal nature of the roofing business
in the Decision.

Yet, these factors were clearly identified

and, in fact, conceded to by the Referee and Mr, Warner consecutively.
See point I.
The adverse v/eather conditions of Spring, 1975, were
reneatedly mentioned in reference to the actual starting
date of employment for Appellant, Barry Raker and David TA7hitoome.
Appellant identified to precise reasons that Valley Roofing's
work began well into May.
MR. ANDERSON:

After that time do you have anv

recollection as to why you didn't get to working
until the middle of May.
MR. TJHITCOME:

Yeah, it was because of the v/eather

last year the v/eather was really bad because
at the same time the other roofers in the valley
were crying they had work they couldn't get done.
REFEREE:

I will concede that we had bad weather

in spring of '75". (Tr. 29).
™ho statements of three of Valley Roofing's first
customers are in support of this fact.

Also see point I,

Exhibits 3, 9, 10.)

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The seasonal nature of the roofing business is
also ignored by the Board in the very face of testimony to
that effect.

The following is consistent with the information

provided by Valley Roofing's customers marked Exhibits 810:
REFEREE:

During January, February and March, were

you trying to time up any jobs for the spring?
MR. WHITCOME:

Yeah,

in-fact, we had some jobs

lined up from the previous year we could have
done if the weather would have broke a little
earlier but it snowed all the way into
the first week in June it snowed.
I do hot work.

Basically,

That's a little different

than shingling —

maybe it's nice today but

if it rained yesterday I wouldn't be able
to work today —

you have to work 2-3 days

consecutively to be warm and dry before you
can do a hot roof.
REFEREE:

It's a little different.

Do you do any other types of roofs?

Asphalt shingles —

cedar shingles?

MR. WHITCOME: yes.
REFEREE : You don't have to wait on those jobs?
MR. WHITCOME:

You have to wait until they're ready.

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Generally builders here only pour foundations
twice a year.

They pour them come spring along

about May or June —

the

job's ready to roof

and usually thatfs our biggest boom because
the contractors have been sitting almost all
winter.

Then comes about September and October

and they dig holes like crazy and try to get
the roofs on them and then they let them sit
so their men can work inside all winter.

So

those are our two biggest times. (Tr. 26-27).
The seasonal nature of the work was even admitted by Mr.
Warner earlier in the proceedings. (Tr. 15-16).
Further substantiation of the irregular work schedule
of roofers is evident from a careful examination of the checks
in Exhibit 3.

There were no large checks written for supplies

or labor until May 14 when a check for $1,285.90 was written
to Cantwell Brothers Supply and one for $188.00 was written
to David Whitcome on May 16, 1975.

It is significant that

none of the above information was gleaned from the hearing
and used in the determination by the Board.
To deny Appellant relief is not consistent with
the purpose of the Employment Security Act.

The act should

be "liberally construed to best effectuate its purpose.
It is directed to meeting those needs of unemployment workers.
First, it is to enable them to find suitable work; second
it is to provide cash benefits during periods of unemployment."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Gocke v Wiesley, 18 U. 2d 245, .420 P. 2d 44, 46 (1966), See
also,

Townsend v Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 27,

U 2d 94, 453 P. 2d 614 (1972).

If the goal is to provide

cash benefits to eligible unemployed, this purpose is not
well served by the Decision.

A liberal construction would

not tolerate a penalty for claimant's error when part of the
Department's supervisory role is to aid new employers in
establishing good business accounting procedures.
The Honorable Stanley 0. Griffin apparently failed
to consider any testimony concerning the weather conditions
and nature of the roofing business in Appellant's particular
case, choosing instead to base his decision on only part of
the evidence presented.

The hearing reflected the weaknesses

of nonadversary proceedings with the hearing officer from the
Department of Employment Security relying totally on the evidence
presented by the Department's own investigators.
CONCLUSION
The Decision of the Board of Review does not
reflect an accurate consideration of all evidence presented.
There is, in fact, no substantial evidence on which the Board
can rely to prove its allegation that Appellant withheld any
material facts.

The only evidence presented by the Department

showed a claimant confounded by the requirements of the
Employment Security Act implementation procedures.
This evidence is more than offset, however, by the
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Board's acceptance and reliance on a totally unacceptable
method for assessing weekly income.

Taking the quarter earninqs

and dividing arbitrarily by the number of weeks in that quarter
does not necessarily demonstrate how much a claimant made
for each week.

This method should be eschewed on appeal in

favor of a more rational approach to determination based on
all evidence presented.

In the instant casef the seasonal

nature of the work should have been considered.

The inclement

weather of spring, 1975 should also enter into a determination
especially since it was conceded by the Referee.

Together,

these neglected elements support the testimony of Barry Baker,
David Whitcome and John Whitcome that they began work after
April 1st.
Since there is no substantial evidence to support
the Decision while there is proof of facts giving rise to
the right to compensation, the decision may be reversed.
Here, where Appellant provided information to the best of
his ability as a roofer, he should not be denied the benefits
of the Employment Security Act which purpose is to provide
cash benefits to the unemployed.
Since he did meet the eligibility requirements of
Sec. 35-4-4 u# C. A. and for the reasons stated above,
Appellant prays the Court to reverse the Decision of the Board
of Review and to award Appellant his due benefits.
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